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Date when decision was rendered: 4.3.1992 Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus Reference: Report No. 758; 492/7/92 Reference to source KHO 1992-A-59. Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 1992 A, General Part Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 1992 A, allmän del Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 1992 A, yleinen osa Place of publication: Helsinki Publisher: The Supreme Administrative Court Date of publication: 1993 Pages: pp. 199-202 Subject
respect for family life,
deportation,
criminal charge,
Relevant legal provisions Sections 40-1-3, 41, 42, 43-1 of the Aliens' Act = utlänningslag 40 § 1 mom. 3 punkten, 41 §, 42 §, 43 § 1 mom. = ulkomaalaislaki 40 § 1 mom. 3 kohta, 41 §, 42 §, 43 § 1 mom. ECHR-8-2, ECHR-12 Abstract As a person had committed several rather serious crimes in Finland, Article 8-2 of the ECHR authorized his expulsion even if he had a spouse and a child in the country. The foreigner X had been sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 15 days for having committed several crimes in Finland, including rape, assault and aggravated assault.X was engaged to a Finn, had a child together with another Finn and studied at a Finnish university.The Ministry of the Interior, basing its decision on the provisions of the Aliens' Act, had decided to expel X at the time he was released from prison and to prohibit him from entering Finland for 2 years.In his appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court, X invoked Articles 8 and 12 of the ECHR, as well as the Berrehab judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (judgement of 21 June 1988, Series A, No. 138).Later on, he informed the Court of having married a Finn.In its judgment, the Supreme Administrative Court stated that the Ministry had had sufficient grounds to decide to expel X when he was released from prison.For this reason the Court, taking also into account Article 8-2 of the ECHR, dismissed the appeal. 24.3.1998 / 2.3.2017 / RHANSKI
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| [2 / 13] |
Date when decision was rendered: 7.9.1993 Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus Reference: Report No. 3234; 2248/7/93 Reference to source Electronic database FKHO within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice Databasen FKHO inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin FKHO-tietokanta Date of publication: Subject
deportation,
respect for family life,
criminal charge,
marriage,
Relevant legal provisions Sections 1, 40-1-3, 40-1-4 and 43-1 of the Aliens' Act = utlänningslag 1 §, 40 § 1 mom. 3 och 4 punkten, 43 § 1 mom. = ulkomaalaislaki 1 §, 40 § 1 mom. 3 ja 4 kohta, 43 § 1 mom. ECHR-8 Abstract The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the expulsion order of a person who had committed serious crimes and had thereafter married a Finn.A foreigner A had been sentenced to imprisonment because of continued rape and attempted rape.Taking into account the nature of the crimes, A could be considered to have shown through his own behaviour that he was a threat to the security of others.The fact that A had married a Finn after the expulsion decision by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs did not preclude his expulsion. 27.3.1998 / 2.3.2017 / RHANSKI
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| [3 / 13] |
Date when decision was rendered: 10.9.1993 Judicial body: Eastern Finland Court of Appeal = Hovrätten i Östra Finland = Itä-Suomen hovioikeus Reference: Report No. 1736; R92/1291 Reference to source I-SHO 1993:8. Electronic database FHOT within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice Databasen FHOT inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin FHOT-tietokanta Date of publication: Subject
right to examine witnesses,
fair trial,
criminal charge,
Relevant legal provisions CCPR-14-3-e Abstract The Eastern Finland Court of Appeal quashed the ruling by the court of first instance and returned the case for retrial.The defendant had been denied the right to have a witness heard by the court.The court referred to Article 14-3-e of the CCPR, according to which everyone shall be entitled, in the determination of a criminal charge against him, to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf. 27.3.1998 / 2.4.2003 / LISNELLM
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| [4 / 13] |
Date when decision was rendered: 11.10.1996 Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus Reference: Report No. 3782; M-95/162 Reference to source KKO 1996:124. Decisions of the Supreme Court 1996 II July-December Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 1996 II juli-december Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1996 II heinä-joulukuu Place of publication: Helsinki Publisher: The Supreme Court Date of publication: 1997 Pages: pp. 615-617 Subject
fair trial,
independent and impartial tribunal,
criminal charge,
Relevant legal provisions Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure; section 2 of the Constitution Act = rättegångsbalken 13 kapitel 1 §; regeringsformen 2 § = oikeudenkäymiskaari 13 luku 1 §; hallitusmuoto 2 §. ECHR-6 Abstract During the proceedings of the Land Court of Eastern Finland in a case concerning the expropriation of a certain land area, which was part of the national programme for the preservation of the seashores, one lay member of the court had a deal concerning the sale of his estates, which also belonged to the same preservation area, pending at the regional environment centre. The Supreme Court noted that according to Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, a judge is disqualified in a case if he has a part in the case or if he can expect to benefit from it or if the case can give him any disadvantage.The Court noted that after Finland's ratification of the ECHR, the possible disqualification of a judge has also to be weighed in the light of the provisions of the ECHR and the established case-law of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights.As way of an example, the Court referred to its own case-law (KKO 1995:185, KKO 1996:80, KKO 1996:81).It referred to Article 6-1 of the ECHR, which states that in the determination of civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.The Supreme Court also referred to section II (17.7.1995/969) of the Constitution Act, which also includes the requirement of the impartiality of the courts. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the pending deal concerning the estates can have created reasonable doubts about the impartiality of the land court in an objective sense.On these grounds, the Supreme Court stated that the lay member in question was disqualified to take part in the proceedings in the land court.The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the land court and returned the case to the land court. 30.3.1998 / 10.10.2012 / RHANSKI
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| [5 / 13] |
Date when decision was rendered: 13.7.1994 Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus Reference: Report No. 2622; R93/44 Reference to source KKO 1994:64. Decisions of the Supreme Court 1994 II July-December Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 1994 II juli-december Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1994 II heinä-joulukuu Place of publication: Helsinki Publisher: The Supreme Court Date of publication: 1995 Pages: pp. 303-307 Subject
criminal charge,
basis of charges,
preparation of defence,
right to be heard,
Relevant legal provisions Section 3 of the Narcotics Act; Chapter 5, section 3-1 of the Penal Code = narkotikalagen 3 §; strafflagen 5 kapitel 3 § 1 mom. = huumausainelaki 3 §; rikoslaki 5 luku 3 § 1 mom. ECHR-6-3-c, CCPR-14-3-a Abstract A had been charged with a serious narcotic offence for illegal possession of 2 kilos of amphetamine together with B.During the proceedings in the court of first instance, the prosecutor secondarily demanded in A's absence that A be convicted for assistance to a serious narcotic offence for having stood guard as B handled the hidden amphetamine.A denied having possessed the drugs at any point.The court of first instance sentenced A to 10 months imprisonment, as it had been shown that A had stood guard while B fetched amphetamine from the hiding place and had helped B to open the hiding place.The fact that A had thus been associated with B was regarded as A having assisted B who sold the drugs. A and the prosecutor brought the case to the court of appeal, which was of the opinion that it had not been shown that A would have assisted B in fetching drugs from the hiding place more than once.His sentence was therefore reduced to 8 months imprisonment. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, A requested that the charges against him are dropped, i.a., as the prosecutor had not demanded his punishment for the action for which he was sentenced.The Supreme Court found that the prosecutor had not made a new request to which A should have been given a chance to respond but only judicially redefined the deed in question.No new charges had been presented and A had not been accused of any action which had not been included in the charges presented in his presence.He had also had the possibility to respond to the charges and to state that his actions did not meet the requirement of being a full accomplice but only of assisting B in B`s crime.The Supreme Court therefore upheld the main decision of the court of appeal.(A vote 3 to 2.) A dissenting justice stated that as A had not received detailed information about the charges against him in accordance with Article 6-3-a of the ECHR and Article 14-3-a of the CCPR, he should not have been sentenced on the basis of these charges.The rapporteur as well as the other dissenting justice made a general reference to A's legal safeguards and would have quashed the decision of the court of first instance and the court of appeal as A had not been heard personally regarding the secondary charges. 6.4.1998 / 14.3.2003 / LISNELLM
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| [6 / 13] |
Date when decision was rendered: 7.9.1994 Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus Reference: Report No. 3105; R93/815 Reference to source KKO 1994:79. Decisions of the Supreme Court 1994 II July-December Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 1994 II juli-december Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1994 II heinä-joulukuu Place of publication: Helsinki Publisher: The Supreme Court Date of publication: 1994 Pages: pp. 350-353 Subject
criminal charge,
fair trial,
law of procedure,
Relevant legal provisions Chapter 23, section 2, and Chapter 21, section 10 of the Penal Code; sections 3-1 and 98 of the Road Traffic Act; Chapter 25, section 7 of the Code of Judicial Procedure = strafflagen 23 kapitel 2 §, 21 kapitel 10 §; vägtrafiklagen 3 § 1 mom. och 98 §; rättegångsbalken 25 kapitel 7 § = rikoslaki 23 luku 2 §, 21 luku 10 §; tieliikennelaki 3 § 1 mom. ja 98 §; oikeudenkäymiskaari 25 luku 7 §. ECHR-6-3-a, ECHRP-7-4 Abstract The court of first instance had given A a suspended sentence of 3 months imprisonment for aggravated drunken driving, endangering the traffic and having caused bodily injury.The public prosecutor notified the court of first instance of his intent to appeal against the decision as far as the meting out of the sentence was concerned. In his appeal to the court of appeal, the public prosecutor demanded that A's prison sentence is to be unconditional and that an earlier suspended prison sentence for drunken driving is enforced.He also suggested that the prison sentences could be carried out as community service.As the public prosecutor had notified the court of first instance of his discontent with the decision of the court only "as far as the meting out of the sentence was concerned", the court of appeal decided not to consider the prosecutor's requests concerning an unconditional sentence and the enforcement of the earlier prison sentence.As the prosecutor had not presented any demands before the court of appeal concerning the meting out of the sentence nor any grounds for changing the decision of the court of first instance, the court of appeal upheld the decision of the lower court. The public prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court.In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that according to Chapter 25, section 7 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, a notification of discontent can be limited to apply to a part of the decision of the first instance court.However, the limitation must concern a clearly distinguishable issue which can be dealt with separately from the rest of the case.In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the meting out of a sentence was part and parcel of the assessment of the punishment and did thus not form a clearly distinguishable, independent issue to which the notification of discontent could be limited to apply.The Court continued by noting that the public prosecutor had already in the court of first instance requested that A's prison sentence would be unconditional and that the earlier prison sentence would be enforced.When receiving A's notification of his discontent with the meting out of the sentence, the chairman of the court of first instance should have asked A to specify his notification.The Supreme Court concluded that as it was not possible to limit the notification of discontent to apply to the meting out of the sentence only, there was nothing to prevent the court of appeal from considering A's request concerning the unconditional sentence and the enforcement of the earlier prison sentence.The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the court of appeal and returned the case to the latter.(A vote 4-1). A dissenting justice was of the opinion that in current legal language the question of a suspended sentence did not form a part of the meting out of the sentence, the two issues being regulated in different Acts.The notification of discontent by the public prosecutor was open to various interpretations, and it could not be interpreted to the detriment of the defendant.As the notification before the court of first instance was limited to the meting out of the sentence, the defendant had reason to believe that the question of the conditionality of the sentence would not be assessed by the court of appeal.The dissenting justice referred to Article 6-3-a of the ECHR and to Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR and concluded that there was no reason to change the decision of the court of appeal. 7.4.1998 / 3.4.2003 / LISNELLM
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| [7 / 13] |
Date when decision was rendered: 25.1.1995 Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus Reference: Report No. 197; R93/474 Reference to source KKO 1995:5. Decisions of the Supreme Court 1995 I January-June Högsta domstolens avgöranden 1995 I januari-juni Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1995 I tammi-kesäkuu Place of publication: Helsinki Publisher: The Supreme Court Date of publication: 1996 Pages: pp. 25-27 Subject
criminal charge,
right to be heard,
right to examine witnesses,
Relevant legal provisions Chapter 12, section 7-1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure = rättegångsbalken 12 kapitel 7 § 1 mom. = oikeudenkäymiskaari 12 luku 7 § 1 mom. ECHR-6-3-d, CCPR-14-3-e Abstract During the pretrial investigation B had stated that his watch had been stolen and that the item was worth FIM 30,000.A denied that he had stolen the watch and that it at any rate would be worth that much.However, he admitted that he had stolen a number of other items from B's apartment in a burglary.The theft of the items A admitted having stolen would, considering the value of the items, have made A liable only for theft, not aggravated theft, he claimed.The lower courts based their decisions on B's statement as to the burglary and the value of the watch, without giving A an opportunity to pose questions to B. A appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming, i.a., that the value of the property he had admittedly stolen had been overstated by B.He also denied having stolen some of the items.A had demanded an oral hearing in the court of appeal, as well as the hearing of B in person regarding the stolen property and its value, but the requests had been rejected. The Supreme Court referred to Article 14-3 of the CCPR and Article 6-3-d of the ECHR on the right of a person charged with a criminal offence to examine or have examined witnesses against him.In this case, the stated value of the watch in particular was considerable and no other evidence as to its theft and value had been presented.As A had not been given an opportunity to pose questions to B re garding the theft and the value of the watch, the lower courts should not have a ccepted B's statement during the pretrial investigation as evidence in the matter.This constituted a procedural error.The Supreme Court returned the case to the court of first instance for retrial in the proper legal order. 15.4.1998 / 13.3.2003 / LISNELLM
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| [8 / 13] |
Date when decision was rendered: 7.2.1995 Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus Reference: Report No. 413; R93/751 Reference to source KKO 1995:7. Decisions of the Supreme Court 1995 I January-June Högsta domstolens avgöranden 1995 I januari-juni Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1995 I tammi-kesäkuu Place of publication: Helsinki Publisher: The Supreme Court Date of publication: 1996 Pages: pp. 31-34 Subject
free trial,
criminal charge,
legal assistance,
Relevant legal provisions Section 10-2 of the Cost-Free Court Proceedings Act = lag om fri rättegång 10 § 2 mom. = laki maksuttomasta oikeudenkäynnistä 10 § 2 mom. ECHR-6-3-c, CCPR-14-3-d Abstract The court of first instance had sentenced A and B to unconditional imprisonment for theft and aggravated drunken driving.Both had pleaded guilty to the charges. A and B appealed to the court of appeal, seeking a reduction of their punishment.In addition to a free trial, they asked to be provided with free legal counsel.As the case concerned an uncomplicated criminal matter, which, with regard to the expected punishment and the clear facts of the case did not require the appointment of a legal counsel, the court of appeal rejected the request.A and B asked the Supreme Court for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court granted A and B leave to appeal as regards the request for free legal assistance in the court of appeal, but rejected the other claims.The Supreme Court first discussed the compatibility of section 10-2-2 of the Cost-Free Court Proceedings (according to which legal counsel cannot be provided in uncomplicated criminal matters where, taking into account the expected punishment and the clear state of facts, the legal protection of the defendant does not require the appointment of a legal counsel) with Finland's international obligations under Article 14-3-d of the CCPR and Article 6-3-c of the ECHR, guaranteeing the right of anyone charged with a criminal offence to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require. In the preparatory work of section 10-2, theft and aggravated drunken driving were mentioned as type examples of uncomplicated criminal matters.The preparatory work indicate that the section was designed to assure free legal assistance when the interests of justice so require, and thus to be in accordance with the provisions of international human rights conventions. The Supreme Court also referred to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which, when considering the obligation of states to provide free legal assistance, has taken into account, i.a., the difficulty of the case and the legal issues, the seriousness of the crime, the maximum punishment, the punishment sentenced in the case, the ability of the defendant to defend himself , the appeals proceedings as a whole and the part of the court of appeal therein , as well as whether there was a fair trial in the court of first instance (see the cases of Pakelli, judgment of 25 April 1983, Series A, No.64; Monell and Morris, judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A No.115; Grange, judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A, No.174; Quaranta, judgment of 24 May 1991, Series A, No.205).According to the case law, the interests of justice do not require that everyone charged with a criminal offence should in all circumstances have the right to free legal assistance. The Supreme Court did not change the decision of the court of appeal not to appoint free legal counsel, taking into account, i.a., the following facts: A and B had defended themselves in the court of first instance and pleaded guilty.They had not claimed not to have received a fair trial in the court of first instance.Both had previously received conditional prison sentences, for which reason the sentencing of unconditional imprisonment was not unexpected.The Supreme Court concluded that the appeal to the court of appeal, in which A and B only requested reduction of the sentences, did not involve such legal or other questions that A and B would have needed legal assistance.Nor were there any personal grounds on the part of either applicant to give reason to assess the need of legal counsel otherwise.The interests of justice did thus not require the appointment of a legal counsel.(A vote.) Two dissenting justices would have granted the request for legal counsel in order to enable the applicants to make a proper appeal, considering that denial of the request may amount to a denial of the right to appeal, which cannot be accepted at least in the case of unconditional prison sentences. 15.4.1998 / 11.4.2007 / RHANSKI
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| [9 / 13] |
Date when decision was rendered: 20.3.1995 Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus Reference: Report No. 1066; R94/35 Reference to source KKO 1995:44. Decisions of the Supreme Court 1995 I January-June Högsta domstolens avgöranden 1995 I januari-juni Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1995 I tammi-kesäkuu Place of publication: Helsinki Publisher: The Supreme Court Date of publication: 1996 Pages: pp. 183-186 Subject
criminal charge,
fair trial,
preparation of defence,
Relevant legal provisions Chapter 17, section 8 of the Code of Judicial Procedure = rättegångsbalken 17 kapitel 8 § = oikeudenkäymiskaari 17 luku 8 §. ECHR-6 Abstract A had been charged with forgery of a bank card and identifying himself as B to obtain economic benefits, and with theft of filled bank transfer forms from a bank, which he supposedly used to obtain the transfer of money to himself.As A had denied the charges and there existed no evidence of A's guilt except for two witness statements, the court of first instance rejected the charges. The prosecutor and the plaintiff bank brought the case to the court of appeal, claiming that A should have been convicted.The court of appeal concluded that the court of first instance would have been entitled, under Chapter 17, section 8 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, to procure evidence on its own initiative.A video tape of the person appearing as B in a bank and photographs that had been shown to several persons during the pretrial investigation were not presented at the hearings in the court of first instance, which did also not hear as a witness a person who was present in the bank at the same time as the person presenting himself as B.Nor had the court acquired statements as to whether the forged documents had been signed by A in B's and other persons' names.The court of first instance should in the opinion of the court of appeal not have decided the case without procuring the above evidence and statement.The court of appeal therefore quashed the judgment and returned the case to the court of first instance. The Supreme Court based its judgment on the principle of the equality of arms of the parties as guaranteed by Article 6 of the ECHR, which has to be taken into consideration when applying Chapter 17, section 8 of the Code of Judicial Procedure.It was obvious that the intention of the court of appeal in returning the case was to order the court of first instance to procure additional evidence .The provision authorising the courts to procure evidence for or against a defendant charged with an offence subject to public prosecution on their own initiative derogates from the main rule that the parties themselves acquire evidence and should therefore be interpreted narrowly, the main rule being that it is for the prosecutor to prove the guilt of the defendant.The principle of the equality of arms requires that the defendant should not be put in a position inferior to that of the prosecutor.The defendant must also at all stages of the trial have adequate possibilities for the preparation of his defence.In this case, the prosecutor and the plaintiff bank had had the possibility to procure or ask the court to procure all necessary evidence against A already in the court of first instance.No additional evidence was presented in the court of appeal either.The decision of the court of appeal to return the case for retrial came as a surprise to the defendant which he had not had the possibility to consider in preparing his defence.The court of appeal should thus have considered the case without returning it to the court of first instance.The Supreme Court returned the case to the court of appeal. 15.4.1998 / 13.3.2003 / LISNELLM
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| [10 / 13] |
Date when decision was rendered: 3.4.1995 Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus Reference: Report No. 1298; R93/803 Reference to source KKO 1995:66. Decisions of the Supreme Court 1995 I January-June Högsta domstolens avgöranden 1995 I januari-juni Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1995 I tammi-kesäkuu Place of publication: Helsinki Publisher: The Supreme Court Date of publication: 1996 Pages: pp. 277-280 Subject
right to examine witnesses,
family,
criminal charge,
Relevant legal provisions Chapter 17, section 20 of the Code of Judicial Procedure = rättegångsbalken 17 kapitel 20 § = oikeudenkäymiskaari 17 luku 20 §. ECHR-6-3-d, CCPR-14-3-e Abstract A was charged with drunken driving on a public road under circumstances that endangered the safety of others.While sitting next to the driver B, who was A's son, A had gripped the steering wheel and caused B to lose control of the car.He was also charged with having neglected to be as careful as the situation merited when having gripped the steering wheel, thereby causing the car to slide off the road.A denied the charges.During the pretrial investigation, B had told police officer C that A had gripped the wheel causing the car to slide off the road.B refused to stand as a witness in the court of first instance referring to his family relations with A.Having heard C's testimony, the court of first instance found A guilty as charged. The court of appeal upheld the decision, referring, i.a., to C's statement and the fact that A had admitted during the pretrial investigation that he had consumed considerable amounts of alcohol before getting into the car.C had also seen A in town in a drunken condition a few hours before the incident. The Supreme Court referred to Chapter 17, section 20 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, which gives relatives a right to refuse to take the witness stand, as well as to Article 6-3-d of the ECHR and Article 14-3-e of the CCPR, which give the accused a right to examine or have examined witnesses against him.As B refused to testify, A had no possibility to question him personally.Hearing C on B's statement constituted a practical denial of the protection of close relatives laid down in Chapter 17, section 20 of the Code of Judicial Procedure.The court of first instance should thus not have allowed C to testify on the above-mentioned issues or used his statement as evidence against A.No other evidence of A's guilt existed.The Supreme Court quashed the decisions of the court of first instance and the court of appeal, released A from the punishment and dismissed the charges against him. 16.4.1998 / 13.3.2003 / LISNELLM
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| [11 / 13] |
Date when decision was rendered: 5.11.1997 Judicial body: Helsinki Court of First Instance = Helsingfors tingsrätt = Helsingin käräjäoikeus Reference: Report No. 233; R97/5299 Reference to source Registry of the Helsinki Court of First Instance Helsingfors tingsrätts registratorskontor Helsingin käräjäoikeuden kirjaamo Date of publication: Subject
racism,
racial discrimination,
criminal charge,
freedom of the press,
Relevant legal provisions Chapter 11, section 8 of the Penal Code, Act on the Freedom of the Press = strafflagen 11 kapitel 8 §; tryckfrihetslagen = rikoslaki 11 luku 8 §; painovapauslaki. CERD-2-1, CCPR-20-2, CCPR-26, ECHR-14 (no direct reference to either in the judgment) Abstract A was charged with incitement to racial hatred for statements included in articles in a sales publication that was publicly distributed.A was editor-in-chief of the publication in question.Out of the 150 copies, about 50 were distributed to book shops, but only 10 were sold.The rest were distributed for free. In the court of first instance, A's lawyer stated that the allegedly derogatory remarks were placed within quotation marks, indicating that they were not intended as derogatory but to emphasize the situation and invoke a discussion.The notion of obtaining a sort of "final solution", which was included in the text, was intended to imply expulsion, according to A's lawyer.He also stated that A was of the opinion that all races in principle are equal, but that he wanted to bring about a discussion on multiracial societies.The statements were not intentional but ill-considered.During the pretrial investigation, A had admitted that certain statements were ill-considered and stated that he had not used them subsequently. According to the public prosecutor, A had surely understood that he incited and also intended to incite to violence, hostility and discrimination. The court of first instance concluded that it had been proven that A had in public by means of his articles in a publication spread statements which threathened, libelled, and insulted groups of black people and refugees who live in Finland by calling them defamatory names and inciting others to take measures that offended the groups' human dignity.A was sentenced to FIM 900 in fines.The chairperson of the court would have dismissed the charges as the statements did not incite to undertake any measures against any groups of people. 17.4.1998 / 31.3.2003 / LISNELLM
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Date when decision was rendered: 13.3.1991 Judicial body: Cathedral Chapter of the Turku Archbishopric = Åbo ärkestifts domkapitel = Turun hiippakunnan tuomiokapituli Reference: Report No. 1791; 1187/90 Reference to source The Cathedral Chapter Domkapitlet Tuomiokapituli Date of publication: Subject
church,
criminal charge,
courts,
fair trial,
Relevant legal provisions Sections 444, 451, 452, 455, 457, 458 of the Church Act; Chapter 7, section 2 of the Penal Code = kyrkolagen 444 §, 451 §, 452 §, 455 §, 457 §, 458 §; strafflagen 7 kapitel 2 § = kirkkolaki 444 §, 451 §, 452 §, 455 §, 457 §, 458 §; rikoslaki 7 luku 2 §. ECHR-6 (unspecified reference) Abstract Based on the Archbishop's request for appropriate measures towards a vicar who had not behaved in accordance with what was required of a priest under the Church Act, the Cathedral Chapter had held a hearing of the vicar and drawn up a protocol of the hearing.The vicar was informed of the contents of the protocol.After this, the Cathedral Chapter had appointed a prosecutor who sent an indictment to the Cathedral Chapter.The documents in the case were sent to the County Dean for a statement.The prosecutor claimed that the vicar had neglected his duty to obey his superior, the Archbishop, and thereby behaved in a way that was inappropriate for a vicar, for which he demanded punishment under sections 96, 99, 108, 397 of the Church Act and Chapter 7, section 2 of the Penal Code. The vicar stated that the hearing in the Cathedral Chapter was contrary to the requirement of a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR.He also asked to be allowed to explain himself again personally to the Cathedral Chapter and that the Cathedral Chapter hear witnesses.These request were rejected by the Cathedral Chapter. The Cathedral Chapter agreed that the provisions of the Church Act on criminal procedure were contrary to the ECHR, which was incorporated into Finnish law.It therefore decided to take into account the provisions of the ECHR.The Cathedral Chapter had in its opinion acted in accordance with the Church Act and within the jurisdiction accorded by it.The procedure followed was however contrary to the requirements of the Article 6 of the ECHR.The Cathedral Chapter was therefore not authorised to give its opinion on the case.It therefore dismissed the case without considering the merits. 17.4.1998 / 31.3.2003 / LISNELLM
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| [13 / 13] |
Date when decision was rendered: 6.4.1998 Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus Reference: Report No. 603; 206/3/98 Reference to source Electronic database FKHO within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice Databasen FKHO inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin FKHO-tietokanta Date of publication: Subject
respect for family life,
deportation,
criminal charge,
Relevant legal provisions Sections 40, 41, 42 and 43 of the Aliens Act = utlänningslag 40 §, 41 §, 42 §, 43 § = ulkomaalaislaki 40 §, 41 §, 42 §, 43 §. ECHR-8 Abstract X had arrived to Finland from Russia with his family in 1991 when he was 13 years old.His mother was married to a Russian man of Finnish origin, and he lived with his parents and had no close relatives in Russia.He had a good knowledge of the Finnish language and studied in the country.He had received a permanent residence status on 25 June 1996. The Directorate of Immigartion, basing its decision on the provisions of the Aliens' Act, had decided to expel X due to a serious drug offence.X appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court.In quashing the decision, the Court referred to the preparatory work of section 43 of the Aliens' Act which deals with expulsion.The preparatory work states that expulsion of persons who have received a permanent residence permit should take place only for very weighty reasons.In addition, if an alien is born in Finland and has lived here all his life or is of Finnish origin, expulsion will hardly come into question.After weighing X's connection to Finland and the length of his residence in the country, against the grounds speaking for an expulsion or the criminal charges a gainst him, the Court found that the reasons speaking against an expulsion were to be accorded more weight. In its decision, the Directorate of Immigration also referred to Article 8 of the ECHR.It noted that X had attained the age of majority and was not in any way dependent on his parents.His expulsion would not violate Article 8 of the ECHR, taking also into account that drug offences constituted a danger to public safety and limitations of the right to family life were thus justified.The Supreme Administrative Court did not refer to the ECHR. 20.4.1998 / 2.3.2017 / RHANSKI
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